COMMENTS

Collateral Attacks on Employment
Discrimination Consent Decrees
Employment discrimination lawsuits often affect the interests
of employees who are not parties to the lawsuits. Those nonparty
effects may be especially pronounced when minority plaintiffs and
their employer negotiate a consent decree establishing quotas for
the hiring or promotion of minorities.' In such cases, the nonparty
"majority" employees can attempt to intervene in the original action to protect their interests. However, if the majority employees
are unable to intervene, their only alternative is to bring a subsequent suit against the employer alleging that the remedies contained in the consent decree are themselves unlawful.
I These cases are typically brought as class actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII. However, some are brought
under other statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
A consent decree is a negotiated settlement which is entered as a judgment of the court,
see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J.,
concurring), and which can have res judicata effect, see infra note 35. When the court enters
the decree, it does not resolve the merits of the underlying dispute, see City of Miami, 664
F.2d at 440 (Rubin, J., concurring), although it may conduct a more limited inquiry into the
propriety of the decree, see infra note 25.
2 Throughout this comment the term "employees" refers both to persons
who are currently working for an employer and to job applicants, except where the distinction is of
particular relevance. The initial suit brought against the employer is referred to as the
"original" action; the plaintiffs in that suit are described as "minority" employees. Later
suits that challenge the consent decree entered in the original suit are referred to as "subsequent" suits; the plaintiffs in those suits are described as "majority" employees.
The use of the terms "minority" and "majority" in this context, however, is somewhat
imprecise. While most original suits are brought by blacks, women, or members of other
groups commonly referred to as minorities, such suits can also be brought by white males.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
In addition, in certain cases, either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or the Attorney General of the United States can sue on behalf of minority employees. See Title VII § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982) (EEOC may bring suits
against private employers; Attorney General may bring suits against state and local government employers). The analysis in this comment is the same whether suit is brought by minority employees, or by the EEOC or the Attorney General.
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These subsequent suits have several undesirable features.
First, they duplicate much of the effort involved in the original
suit. Second, they delay a final resolution of the contested situation. Third, they may result in judgments inconsistent with the
terms of the original consent decree. Fourth, they may undercut a
statutory policy favoring the resolution of employment discrimination disputes through settlement.
Several courts have refused to consider subsequent suits on
the merits. Labeling them "impermissible collateral attacks" on
the consent decree, these courts have dismissed subsequent suits
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, other courts
would allow subsequent suits, reasoning that majority employees
must be permitted to advance their substantive arguments unless
they are barred under accepted principles of res judicata or comity
among federal courts.
This comment examines whether federal courts should reach
the merits of subsequent suits brought by majority employees.
Part I discusses the cases establishing the "impermissible collateral
attack" rule. Part II identifies the possible grounds that might require dismissal of such suits, and finds that none is satisfactory.
The comment thus concludes that federal courts should reach the
merits of the majority employees' claims. Part III then examines
various ways to minimize the costs posed by subsequent suits and
demonstrates that the threatened costs need not materialize:
courts can limit the issues heard in subsequent suits, and if majority employees are joined as parties or are allowed to intervene in
the original action, later suits can be precluded altogether under
established principles of res judicata.
I.

THE "IMPERMISSIBLE

COLLATERAL ATTACK" CASES

A line of four decisions has developed a rule that subsequent
suits by majority employees should always be dismissed as "impermissible collateral attacks" on the judgment in the original action.4
3 Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1294
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
4 The cases are O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 417
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977), Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1375
(W.D.N.Y.), afl'd mem., 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978),
Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981), and
Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ashley v.
City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983). These cases, hereinafter referred to collectively as the
Thaggardcases, share certain facts. In each, minority employees filed a class action alleging
that their employer had discriminated against them in violation of Title VII or other law.
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This rule is based entirely on procedural grounds, rather than on
substantive employment discrimination law. Although other courts
have considered subsequent suits on the merits and have concluded that they do not state a good claim under Title VII or other
law,5 the courts in these four cases never got that far.
In the earliest case, O'Burn v. Shapp,6 majority employees and
applicants argued that due process required that their suit be considered on the merits, since they had not been parties to the original action.7 Rejecting this argument, the district court responded
that "an unqualified right to collaterally relitigate the merits" of a
decree belongs only to "a stranger to a prior suit, who lacks any
opportunity to timely contest the validity of the final judgment
rendered in that prior suit." 8 Since the court in which the original
action was filed continued to maintain jurisdiction over the consent decree, the majority employees and applicants could still contest the decree by attempting to intervene in the original action.
Thus, the district court dismissed their subsequent suit.'
10 involved a challenge to
The second case, Prate v. Freedman,
a consent decree establishing preferential procedures for hiring
nonwhite police officers. Unlike the majority employees and applicants in O'Burn, the Prate plaintiffs had already sought to intervene in the original action, but since their request came more than
a year after entry of the consent decree, it was denied as un-

The parties then negotiated a consent decree requiring that a certain percentage of positions
be filled with members of the plaintiffs' class. See, e.g., Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 67 (consent
decree provided that black and white employees were to be promoted in a "one-to-one ratio
until the proportion of black persons in supervisory positions and in the ranks of patrolmen
substantially equalled the proportion of blacks to whites in the City of Jackson"). Subsequently, majority employees who were not parties to the original action brought separate
suits contending that the employer, by complying with the terms of the consent decree, had
engaged in "reverse discrimination." These suits sought injunctive relief, compensatory relief, or both. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 21 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1120, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 1979), af['d on other grounds, 658 F.2d 694 (9th
Cir. 1981); see also EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232, 1238 (6th Cir. 1980)
(considering the merits of a collateral challenge to a consent decree that provided retroactive seniority for some employees).
6 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa.), af'd mem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 968 (1977).
7 Id. at 552.
8 Id.
I Id. at 553. The court based its dismissal on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
FED. P, CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
,0430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y.), af'd mem., 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 922 (1978).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:147

timely. 1 Thus, a separate suit offered the only remaining opportunity for them to contest the decree. Nonetheless, the court dismissed their subsequent suit, noting that they "should properly
have sought timely intervention in the [original] case, but failed to
do so."12 In support of its decision, the court argued that allowing
the challenge would "clearly violate the policy under Title VII to
promote settlement . . . , would also result in continued uncertainty for all parties involved and [would] render the concept of
final judgments meaningless."' 3
In Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power,14 majority employees attempted to avoid the rule of O'Burn
and Prate by seeking compensatory damages rather than injunctive relief.25 The Ninth Circuit rejected the distinction.", Contending that subsequent actions were "inimical to the policy underlying
Title VII of promoting settlements" and could subject the employer to inconsistent obligations, the court followed the "settled"
7
rule "that a consent decree is not subject to collateral attack."'
Finally, in Thaggard v. City of Jackson,"8 the Fifth Circuit
confronted a situation much like that in Prate: the majority employees had tried unsuccessfully to intervene in the original suit, so
that a separate action was their only remaining option. Citing the
"settled" rule of Dennison and the policy concerns of Prate, the

" Id. at 1374. The requirement that a request to intervene be "timely" is imposed by
rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
:2 430 F. Supp. at 1375 (emphasis added).
3 Id. (citations omitted).
14 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
15 In O'Burn, the majority employees sued for an injunction. See 70 F.R.D. at 551. In
Prate, the majority employees sought both compensatory damages and an injunction. See
430 F. Supp. at 1374.
'6 Dennison, 658 F.2d at 695 (compensation granted in a subsequent suit "would drastically increase the cost of each promotion and would burden [the defendant employer] for
complying with the consent decree"). The Ninth Circuit thus rejected the approach taken in
McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976). McAleer involved a
subsequent suit brought by a majority employee entitled to a promotion under a collective
bargaining agreement who was denied the promotion because of a quota established by a
consent decree. Id. at 436-37. While the court refused to order the employer to promote the
plaintiff, it held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. Id. at 439-41; see also id. at 438
(court refused to consider majority employee's direct challenge to quota's validity).
17 Dennison, 658 F.2d at 695-96. The Ninth Circuit also deemed it fair to dismiss the
subsequent suit because the lower court had, before entering the consent decree, held a
hearing in which the union representing the majority employees was allowed to participate
and raise objections to the decree. Id. at 696. For a criticism of that reasoning, see infra note
50.
Is 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464
U.S. 900 (1983).
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court affirmed a dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."9 The court refused to consider whether the plaintiffs should
have been allowed to intervene in the original action.20
While the majority of courts considering the issue have accepted this rule barring collateral attacks on consent decrees,2
some courts and individual judges either have explicitly rejected it
or have indirectly suggested that they would reject it.2 2 Most nota-

'" Id. at 68. The court also rejected the majority employees' argument that their suit
was not a collateral attack since it was based on actions of the employer which allegedly
contravened the decrees: "[P]laintiffs' position necessitates a decision regarding precisely
what activity is mandated by the decrees' requirement that defendants 'seek to achieve'
certain goals.. . . [However, i]mplementation of and continued compliance with the consent
decrees is under the supervision of the district court that entered the decrees." Id. (footnote
omitted).
20 Id. at 69. The Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed the trial court's decision denying
intervention. See Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985).
21 In addition to the Ninth Circuit (in Dennison) and the Fifth Circuit (in Thaggard,
but see infra note 22), a number of other circuits either have adopted the Thaggardrule, or
have taken similar approaches. The First Circuit endorsed the rule in dicta in Culbreath v.
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit endorsed it in Grann v. City of
Madison, 738 F.2d 786, 796 (7th Cir.) (where the employer promoted minority employees in
response to a state agency's order, the court saw "no more reason to permit a collateral
attack on the agency's order than we do to permit a collateral attack on a consent decree"),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 296 (1984), although the court seemed also to base dismissal on
substantive Title VII law, see 738 F.2d at 794 ("the only rational resolution of the issue
posed by plaintiffs is to hold that reliance on a state agency's order. . . is an absolute bar to
a suit by fellow employees"). The Sixth Circuit relied on a somewhat confused mix of substantive and procedural grounds to conclude that "reverse discrimination challenges to reasonable consent decrees are impermissible collateral attacks." Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't,
679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). But cf. EEOC v. McCall Printing
Corp., 633 F.2d 1232, 1238 (6th Cir. 1980) (reaching the merits of a collateral challenge to a
consent decree that granted retroactive seniority to some employees). The Fourth Circuit
appeared to take an approach similar to Thaggard in Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657
F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982). However, the decision is somewhat
ambiguous since it does not expressly identify the plaintiffs who brought the subsequent
suit, leaving open the possibility that they were members of the plaintiff class in the original
action and therefore bound by its result under res judicata. Lastly, the Third Circuit's approach to a case outside the employment discrimination context suggests that it would
adopt an approach similar to Thaggard. See Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d
1045, 1050-52 (3d Cir. 1980) ("We. . . agree that an unjustified or unreasonable failure to
intervene [in the original action] can serve to bar a later collateral attack.").
Some lower courts either have endorsed the Thaggard approach, see, e.g., Austin v.
County of DeKalb, 572 F. Supp. 479, 481 (N.D. Ga. 1983), or have suggested that it has
some merit, see, e.g., Cuesta v. New York Office of Court Admin., 571 F. Supp. 392, 395-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
22 See Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518 & n.20 (11th
Cir. 1983) (discussed infra at note 26); Reeves v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965, 969-72 (11th Cir.
1985) (adhering to the rule adopted in Jefferson County); Johnson v. North Carolina State
Highway Patrol, 91 F.R.D. 406, 408 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F.
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bly, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Brennan in dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in Thaggard, characterized that case
as presenting "the question [of] whether a victim of alleged discrimination may have his right to sue totally extinguished by a
prior suit to which he was not a party and in which a consent decree was entered before his cause of action even accrued."23 Justice
Rehnquist argued that under established principles of res judicata
and due process, the subsequent suit should be allowed to proceed
as long as the plaintiff was "not a party nor a privy" to the original
litigation.2 4 He contended that due process concerns are particularly strong when the judgment given preclusive effect is a consent
decree, which "is little more than a contract between the parties,
formalized by the signature of a judge."2 5 Finally, Justice RehnSupp. 1084, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d
770 (9th Cir. 1981); Bacica v. Board of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 882, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (consent decree entered in state court suit does not preclude subsequent federal court suit
brought by nonparty majority employees).
In addition, one panel of the Fifth Circuit has expressed second thoughts about the
holding in Thaggard. In Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985), that
panel affirmed the Thaggardtrial court's refusal to allow majority employees to intervene in
the original suit. But the panel observed:
[If] well-settled intervention rules in combination with the rule of Thaggardv. City of
Jackson, to which we are firmly bound here, unjustly deny a party his day in court,
then the appropriate remedy lies in reexamination of the Thaggard doctrine in the
appropriate forum, particularly in light of the persuasive opinion of Justice Rehnquist,
joined in by Justice Brennan, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Thaggard
Id. at 1210.
" Ashley, 464 U.S. at 900.
24 Id. at 902 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979)).
"Privity" is a shorthand term used to describe several narrow exceptions to the general rule
that a judgment cannot preclude subsequent litigation by persons who were not parties to
the judgment. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
25 Ashley, 464 U.S. at 902. When a court enters a consent decree, it does not resolve
the merits of the underlying dispute. See supra note 1. Beyond that, there is considerable
variation in the extent to which courts will attempt to inquire into the propriety of the
decree. Some consent decrees are "rubber stamped" by the entering court. For example, in
cases where the federal government brings suit on behalf of minority employees, courts
often enter a decree on the same day that the complaint is filed. See Schwarzschild, Public
Law by Private Bargain:Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 887, 913. However, some courts assert that the decree
should be "examine[d] carefully" to ensure that it is a fair resolution of the dispute and
does not violate "Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence." United States v. City of Miami,
664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring). Furthermore, when the
decree settles a class action, courts should hold hearings-sometimes referred to as "fairness
hearings"-to consider any substantial objections to the decree raised by members of the
plaintiff class. See, e.g., Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835-36
(9th Cir. 1976); Schwarzschild, supra, at 914-15; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring
court approval of proposed settlements of class actions; also requiring that class members be
given notice of proposed settlements). A few courts have invited majority employees to ap-
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quist suggested that while compliance with a decree might give rise
to a "good faith" defense, it should not block suit altogether. 6
II. THE

DUTY TO HEAR COLLATERAL ATTACKS BY
MAJORITY EMPLOYEES

In dismissing the subsequent suits of majority employees, the
courts in the line of cases which culminated in Thaggard have
drawn upon three distinct sources of authority. One is the doctrine
of res judicata, under which litigation can be precluded if an earlier matter involving the same or similar subject matter has already proceeded to judgment.2 7 Another is the principle of comity,
which allows courts, in their discretion, to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a suit if an action involving the same or similar subject
matter is pending before another court. 28 And a third is Title VII
itself: subsequent suits could undercut a congressional policy
favoring the voluntary resolution of employment discrimination
disputes.2 9
Although the Thaggard courts have looked to each of these
sources of authority, they have done so haphazardly and with little
explanation. Most notably, they do not clearly distinguish between
res judicata and comity. They have frequently addressed the issues
posed by subsequent suits in res judicata terms: they have expressed concern about preserving the finality of judgments, and
pear at such hearings, although the practice does not appear to be widespread. See supra
note 17 (discussing the hearing held by the original court in Dennison); Schwarzschild,
supra, at 919.
26Ashley, 464 U.S. at 903. In United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th
Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the res judicata and due process principles
identified by Justice Rehnquist governed the question of whether majority employees could
bring a subsequent suit. Id. at 1517-18, 1519 n.20 (Res judicata "prevent[s] the attack of a
prior judgment by parties to the proceedings or by those with sufficient identity of interests
with such parties that their interests are deemed to have been litigated in those proceedings.
A final judgment may not, however, bind a nonparty when his interests were not represented."). It then discussed the issues it envisioned arising in such a suit. First, it observed
that if "the employer undertook the challenged action pursuant to a court-approved consent
decree [this] would be evidence of nondiscriminatory intent by the employer, and the nonparty could not seek to relitigate the merits or reasonableness of the decree vis-a-vis the
parties to the decree." Id. at 1518 (citation omitted). The court added that if the employer
offered its compliance with the consent decree as a defense to the majority employees'
claims, "the trial judge would have to determine whether the defendant's action was mandated by the decree and, if so, whether that fact alone would relieve the defendant of liability that would otherwise attach." Id. The court did not suggest how the latter question
should be answered.
27 See' infra notes 33-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
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have invoked principles and terms developed in res judicata
cases.3 0 But they ultimately have dismissed on grounds of lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, 31 a disposition more consistent with
the comity notion that, as long as a court's consent decree remains
in effect, only that court has jurisdiction to consider disputes arising from the decree's operation.32
This section examines each of the rationales underlying the
Thaggard line of decisions. It first considers whether it is consistent with due process for courts to apply principles of res judicata
to bind majority employees to the judgment entered in the original
action. Then it examines whether the dismissal of subsequent suits
accords with the principles of comity. Finally, it evaluates the contention that subsequent suits frustrate Title VII's policy of promoting settlements.
A.

Res Judicata and the Requirements of Due Process

The Thaggard courts have rested their dismissals of subsequent suits in large part on principles of res judicata. In general,
30 For example, the Thaggard courts have argued that it is fair to dismiss subsequent
suits by majority employees because those employees had an opportunity to intervene in the
original action, see, e.g., Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696; Prate,430 F. Supp. at 1375, an argument with roots in the case law on res judicata, see infra notes 44-49 and accompanying
text. They also describe subsequent suits by majority employees as constituting "impermissible collateral attack[s]" that would undermine the finality of judgments entered in the
original actions. Prate, 430 F. Supp. at 1375. Outside the employment discrimination context, "impermissible collateral attack" appears to be a term of art used to describe suits
precluded under principles of res judicata. See, e.g., Miller v. Meinhard-Commercial Corp.,
462 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he confirmation of the arrangement by the referee
was proper and its effect is res judicata to the claim raised in this suit. . . . The suit is no
more than a collateral attack upon the referee's order."); 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 .405[4.-1], at 198-99 (1984); id. .407, at 287.
11 See, e.g., Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69; Prate, 430 F. Supp. at 1375; O'Burn, 70 F.R.D.
at 553. The courts dismiss on this ground under rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In contrast, res judicata is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded under
rule 8(c), and proved by the party asserting it. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4405 (1981).
The Thaggard courts' reliance on rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss subsequent suits because of
the pendency of another action is a somewhat unusual use of the rule, for which there is no
close parallel outside the employment discrimination context. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1350 (1969); cf. infra note 76 and accompanying text

(discussing a court's inherent power to stay or dismiss suits on comity grounds).
11 See O'Burn, 70 F.R.D. at 553. The court in O'Burn emphasized the fact that the
original court had explicitly retained jurisdiction over the decree. Id. at 552-53. Nevertheless, the comity analysis does not depend on an explicit retention of jurisdiction, since the
original court would in any event have authority to modify the decree. See United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932);-Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 170 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
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those principles are used to determine whether a prior judgment
can serve as the basis for precluding subsequent litigation. The
doctrine of res judicata thus helps to avoid duplication of effort
and inconsistent judgments, and ensures that disputes can be resolved with some finality. 3
Prior judgments may prevent subsequent litigation in two
ways: through claim preclusion and through issue preclusion.
Under claim preclusion, the assertion of a claim in a suit that results in a valid final judgment bars subsequent actions on the same
claim, whether or not all the grounds that could have been advanced to support the claim were actually presented in the original
action.3 4 Under issue preclusion, the resolution of an issue in the
original suit is binding in subsequent litigation if the issue was actually litigated and its resolution was essential to the original
judgment.3 5
There is considerable tension between these res judicata rules
and the requirements of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process; indeed, to a large extent the latter determine the limits of the
former.36 One central due process principle was articulated by the
37
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
Mullane involved a statute that established a procedure for considering claims by trust beneficiaries against their trustee. Under
the statute, notice of judicial proceedings to adjudicate such claims
was to be published in a local newspaper; the claims of any beneficiaries who failed to participate were to be extinguished. The
Court held that the statute violated due process because it provided the beneficiaries with insufficient notice of the opportunity
to present their claims. According to the Court, "[a]n elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
33See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4403 (res judicata prevents the
"corrosive disrespect" which would result from inconsistent judgments, preserves judicial
resources, and provides repose for the original parties).
31 Id. § 4406. For an elaboration of the definition provided in the text, see id. §§ 44064415; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-26 (1980).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). For an elaboration of the definition provided in the text, see id. § 28; 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, §§ 44164426. The requirement that an issue be "actually litigated" means that consent judgments
cannot have issue preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, since a court which enters a
consent judgment does not resolve the issues which underlie the dispute. See supra notes 1,
25. However, consent judgments can have claim preclusive effect. See 18 WRIGHT MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 31, § 4443.
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 6-7 (1980). This comment will use the
phrase "due process" to refer to the due process clauses of both the fifth and the fourteenth
amendments.
-7 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
3s
their objections.
The Mullane requirement of notice and an opportunity to be
heard sharply limits the extent to which principles of res judicata
can be used to preclude suits by persons who were not parties to
the original action. 9 Indeed, "[t]he basic premise of preclusion is
that parties to a prior action are bound and nonparties are not
bound. '4 0 Yet there are some circumstances in which preclusion of
a nonparty is considered acceptable.4 1 One occurs when the nonparty controlled a party's conduct of the original litigation to such
an extent that the nonparty can fairly be treated as though he had
been a party. 42 Another occurs when the nonparty's interests were
adequately represented by a party in the original litigation.4 3

Id. at 314.
See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4449, at 415.
40

Id. at 411.

41 Nonparties who can be precluded are often described as having been in "privity"

with a party. See id., § 4449, at 418-19.
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 39 (1980); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
supra note 31, § 4451. However, "it is not enough that the nonparty supplied an
attorney or is represented by the same law firm; helped to finance the litigation; appeared as
an amicus curiae; testified as a witness; participated in consolidated pretrial proceedings;
undertook some limited presentations to the court; or otherwise participated in a limited
way." Id. § 4451, at 432-33 (footnotes omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 39 comment c (1980). But such acts may be evidence of control. See Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979).
This theory of nonparty preclusion-which will be referred to here as de facto participation-has on occasion been applied to majority employees in the employment discrimination context. See, e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 915-18 (3d Cir.
1978). However, for two reasons it probably cannot be used to preclude suits that challenge
consent decrees. First, consent decrees generally cannot have issue preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. See supra note 35. In addition, de facto participation cannot lead to
claim preclusion, because "the person controlling the litigation, as a non-party, is by definition asserting or defending a claim other than the one he himself may have." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 comment b (1980); see also Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. at 154.
43 See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4454, at 459. This theory of
nonparty preclusion-which will be referred to here as adequate representation-has its
roots in a few limited classes of relationships, involving, for example, "[t]rustees, executors,
statutory representatives in death and survival actions, and guardians." Id. § 4448, at 409.
However, the theory has also been applied to class actions, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4455; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e) & comment e (1980), and to litigation undertaken by collective bargaining representatives, see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4456; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (1980); see also Telephone Workers Union v. New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 31, 33-34 (3d Cir. 1978). Hansberry is the leading modern case considering the limits that due process places on the theory of adequate representation. As
COOPER,
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Some courts and commentators have attempted to develop 4a
third category of nonparty preclusion: "mandatory intervention."
Under mandatory intervention, a person who passes up an opportunity to intervene in an action can be bound by its result. The
Supreme Court in 1934 expressed disapproval of a rule of
mandatory intervention: "The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. ' 45 However, in the late
1960s some movement occurred in the Court's position. In the
Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases,46 the Court
held that when a number of persons brought separate suits challenging a single administrative order and all but one of those suits
were stayed, those persons who then failed to intervene in the remaining suit were bound by its result. 47 The Court's holding may
be restricted to the facts of that case; 48 nevertheless, a short time

interpreted by subsequent cases, Hansberry imposes a two-prong due process requirement:
(1) the interests of the nonparty must have been aligned with those of the party; and (2) the
party must in fact have done an adequate job of representing those interests. See 311 U.S.
at 41-43; Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1973); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 31, § 4455, at 478-82.
Some courts and commentators have sought to extend the adequate representation theory beyond these established contexts to any case in which the minimum due process requirements of Hansberryare met. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710,
719-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); Cauefield v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 378 F.2d 876, 878-79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4457, at 494; Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusion:
Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 378-81 (1974). However, this extension of the theory has
not been broadly accepted, and even the courts that invoke the theory outside its traditional
contexts typically do so only in cases where other theories of preclusion are also applicable.
See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4457, at 495-99.
The Third Circuit appeared to attempt such an extension of the adequate representation theory in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1978),
where it concluded that nonparty majority applicants were bound by a decree because their
potential employer had adequately represented their interests in the original litigation. Few
other courts have considered this possible application of the theory. See, e.g., Harmon v.
San Diego County, 477 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (the employer "did not necessarily have interests identical to or parallel with those of its male white employees"), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1981).
44See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4452.
4" Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934).
46 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
47 Id. at 505-06.
" The holding could be narrowed on two grounds. First, the Supreme Court had reviewed and affirmed much of the district court's decision in the suit which was not stayed.
Id. Thus, the Court's pronouncement that the non-intervenors were bound can be interpreted as "simply stating the obvious fact that inferior courts may not reverse the Supreme
Court or its rulings." Morris v. Gressette, 425 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D.S.C. 1976) (threejudge panel), aff'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). Second, it could be interpreted as
being "peculiar to multiple proceedings to review a single administrative order. There is a
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later, the Court suggested that the broader use of mandatory intervention remained an open question.4 9
The courts in the Thaggard line of cases appear to rely primarily on a principle of mandatory intervention." To these courts,

great need for speed, and little reason to suppose that individual litigants should be protected against the burdens of litigating in inconvenient courts with unattractive allies." 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4452, at 450; see McCoid, A Single Package for
Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 719 (1976). But see Penn-CentralMerger and
N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. at 541-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (interpreting
the majority opinion as "declar[ing] . . . a new rule of res judicata").
"' See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968)
("[I]t might be argued that Dutcher should be bound by the previous decision because,
although technically a nonparty, he had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to
intervene. We do not now decide whether such an argument would be correct under the
circumstances of this case."). Since Provident Tradesmens, the majority of courts to consider mandatory intervention have rejected it. See, e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1216-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980); McGhee v. United
States, 437 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (Ct. Cl. 1971); see also 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 31, § 4452, at 447-49 & nn.15, 17-19; Note, Preclusionof Absent Disputants to Compel
Intervention,79 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1562 & n.77 (1979). However, a few courts have relied
on mandatory intervention to preclude nonparties, although typically other theories of preclusion were also applicable in those cases. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 512-18 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340 (5th
Cir. 1980), aff'd in partand rev'd in part on other grounds, 458 U.S. 670 (1982); 18 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, § 4452, at 450-51 & nn.26-27. Other courts have approved
the use of mandatory intervention to preclude nonparties in certain limited contexts. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.7 (1st Cir. 1978).
50 See Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 68 (challenges to a decree should be made before the
original court; the subsequent court will not consider whether the original court erred in
denying intervention); Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696 (majority employees' subsequent suit is
precluded since the union which represents them "had sufficient opportunity to intervene
[in the original] suit prior to the entry of the consent decree"); Prate,430 F. Supp. at 1375
(plaintiffs in the subsequent suit "should properly have sought timely intervention in the
[original] case, but failed to do so"); O'Burn, 70 F.R.D. at 552-53 (the subsequent suit
should be dismissed since plaintiffs can present their views by intervening in the original
action).
The only one of those cases to invoke another theory of preclusion is Dennison. There
the district court which considered the minority employees' original suit held a "Fairness
Hearing to allow persons who had previously submitted written objections to the consent
decree the opportunity to present orally their objections to the court." Dennison, 658 F.2d
at 695; see also supra note 25 (discussing the use of such hearings). All employees received
written notice of the hearing, and the union representing the majority employees appeared
at the hearing and "criticized the adverse impact of the consent decree on non-minority
employees." Id. In dismissing a subsequent suit brought by majority employees, the Ninth
Circuit argued that "the Fairness Hearing. . . adequately afforded the union an opportunity to present to the court its view." Id. at 696.
The Ninth Circuit thus appeared to be invoking something like the de facto participation theory of nonparty preclusion: the majority employees' union had participated informally in the original proceeding to such an extent that it was fair to preclude subsequent
litigation by the employees or their union. However, under traditional interpretations of the
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majority employees can obtain a hearing on the merits of their
claims only by intervening in the original action pursuant to rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 1 If majority employees
fail to intervene, or if their request to intervene is denied, they will
be bound by the judgment and lose the right to assert any claims
which should properly have been raised in the original action.
In effect, the Thaggard courts have concluded that intervention under rule 24 provides majority employees with a constitutionally adequate opportunity to assert their interests. However,
that conclusion may be incorrect. Rule 24 does not require the parties to an action to notify would-be intervenors that the suit is
pending. Instead, the rule puts the burden on nonparties to take
the initiative, and further provides that nonparties' requests to intervene can be denied if they are not "timely. ' ' 52 A number of

de facto participation theory, see supra note 42, preclusion would not be appropriate on the
facts of Dennison since there was no evidence that the majority employees' union exerted
any control over the actual parties' conduct of the litigation. While the due process clause
might permit an exteIsion of the de facto participation theory beyond the theory's traditional scope, it is not clear whether it would permit an expansion as far as the Ninth Circuit
appears to advocate. The answer to that question would lie in a careful consideration of
several factors, including the nature of the majority employees' interests and the procedural
rights available to them in the fairness hearing, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33435 (1976), an inquiry which the Ninth Circuit did not even attempt.
51 A possible variation on this procedure is suggested by the Dennison court's argument that majority employees could be bound by the result of the original suit because their
union had participated in a "Fairness Hearing" held by the court in that suit. See supra
note 50. Presumably that argument could be coupled with the mandatory intervention principle to hold that majority employees are bound by the result of the original suit if they pass
up an opportunity to participate in a fairness hearing held in the course of that suit. Such
an approach might comport with due process. But see supra note 50; infra notes 52-67 and
accompanying text. Yet courts probably lack the power to adopt it. See infra notes 68-71
and accompanying text.
51 Rule 24 provides in relevant part

(a)

INTERVENTION OF RIGHT.

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by the existing parties.

(b)

PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted

to intervene in an action: . . .(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. . . .In exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED.

R. Civ. P. 24.

Both sections of the rule impose several requirements in addition to timeliness. Courts
have occasionally relied on these other requirements in rejecting majority employees' motions to intervene. See, e.g., Johnson v. North Carolina State Highway Patrol, 91 F.R.D. 406,
407 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (request for intervention under rule 24(a)(2) denied because would-be
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courts have held that intervention can be denied as untimely when
a potential intervenor "knew or should have known of the pendency" of the action from newspaper accounts or other informal
means and failed to act promptly thereafter."
The timeliness requirement of rule 24, taken together with the
Thaggard courts' mandatory intervention procedure, means that
majority employees can be precluded from bringing a subsequent
suit even if the only notice they had of the original proceeding was
provided by informal media accounts. This result conflicts with
Mullane and other Supreme Court cases considering the due process limits on res judicata. The most obvious constitutional flaw
arises from the content of the notice provided to majority employees. The Supreme Court considered the minimum requirements
which the due process clause places on the content of notice in
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft.4 There, a municipal utility repeatedly shut off the plaintiffs' utility service for alleged nonpayment. Before shutting off the service, the utility had
mailed notices to the plaintiffs which stated only that the service
would be discontinued if payment was not made by a certain date.
The Court held that the termination of service violated due process, since the notices did not advise the plaintiffs of a procedure
for contesting their bills. 5 According to the Court, "[t]he purpose
of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected
individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending

intervenor lacked sufficient interest in the subject matter); cf. Howard v. McLucas, 597 F.
Supp. 1501, 1502-03 (M.D. Ga. 1984) (proposed consent decree would have such a small
impact on majority employees' interests that they "lack standing" to intervene). However,
the timeliness requirement appears to have been the most prevalent ground for denying
majority employees' motions to intervene. See infra note 53 (citing cases).
53 NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366-67 (1973). Noting that the question of timeliness "is to be determined from all the circumstances," id. at 366, the Court also based its
determination on other factors such as the absence of "unusual circumstances" which might
warrant late intervention, id. at 368. Building on the Supreme Court's "all the circumstances" approach, lower courts have fashioned multi-factor tests to evaluate timeliness.
See, e.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, in addition
to considering when the would-be intervenor should have known of the action, some courts
also take into account factors such as the "prejudice" which the original parties would suffer
if intervention is allowed. See, e.g., Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1980).
A court's timeliness determination will be overturned only if it is found to be an abuse of
discretion. NAACP, 413 U.S. at 366.
For cases denying intervention to majority employees on timeliness grounds, see Reeves
v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965, 969-70 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1985); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679
Orders v. Stotts, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); CulF.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.
breath, 630 F.2d at 20-21.
" 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
55 Id. at 13-15.
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'hearing.' ",5 The Court added that there was particularly strong
reason to require informative notice when the notice was being directed to laypersons who were likely to be unsophisticated about
57
their legal rights.
Craft involved a quasi-administrative proceeding, in which the
government was a party in interest, as opposed to a judicial proceeding. While that difference might affect the precise content of
the notice which would be required in each context, nevertheless
the underlying principle is the same. In Mullane, which involved a
judicial proceeding between private parties, the Court observed
that the purpose of notice is to enable the recipient to "choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. 5'8 That
standard was not met in Craft because although the plaintiffs were
alerted to the threat to their interests, they were not informed of
the availability of a hearing. The notice provided to majority employees under the Thaggard courts' approach is similarly flawed
since majority employees are not advised that they must choose
between intervening in the original suit or being bound by its
result.
Indeed, the notice which majority employees receive is even
less adequate than that found deficient in Craft. In Craft, the
plaintiffs at least received some tangible, affirmative indication
that the state's coercive power was being invoked against them.
Under the Thaggard courts' approach, the original parties are not
required to provide the majority employees with any notice whatsoever; rather, the mere existence of the original suit may be
deemed sufficient to put the majority employees on notice.5 9 For
example, some motions to intervene have been denied as untimely
even though the majority employees sought to intervene before a
consent decree establishing quotas was proposed, on the ground
that even without formal notice the possibility of such relief should
have been apparent earlier from the nature of the suit.60 The

56Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
1,Id. at 15 n.15.
58 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. For other cases which consider the limits that due process
places on the content of notice in judicial proceedings, see In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759
F.2d 1440, 1448-50 (9th Cir. 1985) (notice in a bankruptcy proceeding found to be constitutionally inadequate); Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (W.D. Va. 1983) (notice
provided in a post-judgment garnishment proceeding found to be constitutionally inadequate); Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (1972) (notice
given in foreign language found to be constitutionally inadequate).
" See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; infra note 60 and accompanying text.
10 See Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 17-21 (1st Cir. 1980) (original suit filed in
1974; organization representing majority employees moved to intervene in November, 1978,
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Thaggard approach places an excessive burden of inquiry on majority employees,6 1 with a concomitant risk that they will misapprehend the nature of the threat to their interests and thus fail to
62
intervene promptly.
There is potentially another constitutional defect in the notice
procedure which underlies the Thaggard courts' mandatory intervention system. To call it a "procedure" is to suggest the existence
of an element of regularity which is totally lacking: the original
parties are not required to do anything to set the procedure in motion; the provision of notice is totally arbitrary; and courts are embroiled in case-by-case inquiries into what the majority employees
should have known. Such a procedure is at best anomalous in light
of modern Supreme Court cases in this area, which have focused
on the likelihood that detailed notice procedures established by
statute or rule will result in actual notice being given to all the
intended recipients.6 3 Although the cases are ambiguous, they arguably suggest that due process requires something more than actual notice; specifically, due process may require the existence of a
"formally and officially predetermined and declared [notice system] which, when followed according to its own terms, is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. '64 If so, then the Thaggard

one month before proposed consent decree was submitted to district court; intervention denied as untimely).
61 Cf. Craft, 436 U.S. at 15 n.15 (due process requires especially informative notice
given the lack of sophistication of the laypersons to whom notice was directed). In Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), the Court considered a mortgagee's challenge to a statute which provided that land could be sold at a tax sale after notice was
posted at the county courthouse, published in a newspaper, and mailed to the last known
address of the property owner. In holding that the notice procedure violated due process,
the Court rejected the dissenting justices' argument that the procedure was sufficent because mortgagees were likely to be sophisticated parties who could apprise themselves of the
pendency of tax sales. Id. at 799-800. But see id. at 807-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion by arguing that "[w]hen a party is unreasonable in failing to
protect its interest despite its ability to do so, due process does not require that the State
save the party from its own lack of care").
62 Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 n.7, 437 (1982) (although the
state can extinguish the claims of litigants who do not comply with procedural rules governing the presentation of those claims, such rules must be "reasonable").
'S See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 797-800; Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U.S. 444, 449-56 (1982); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15, 318-19.
4 ROBERT CASAD, JURISDICTION IN Civm ACTIONS 1 2.03[1][c] (1983) (footnote omitted).
Casad bases his argument for the existence of such a requirement on Wuchter v. Pizutti, 276
U.S. 13 (1928). In Wuchter, the Supreme Court found that a notice procedure established
by statute violated due process because it did not have a reasonable likelihood of providing
actual notice. Id. at 19-25. The court held that the due process rights of the defendant had
been violated even though the defendant had in fact received actual notice of the action,
although by a means which was not required by the statute: "[n]ot having been directed by
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courts' procedure is clearly deficient.
Another potential problem with the mandatory intervention
system endorsed by the Thaggard courts centers not upon notice,
but upon personal jurisdiction and venue. The Thaggard system
binds majority employees if they fail to intervene in the forum
chosen by the plaintiffs in the original action. Yet in some instances the original court may have lacked personal jurisdiction
over the majority employees, or those employees may have had
valid objections to venue.6 5 Binding those majority employees
would therefore circumvent the statutes setting limits on personal
jurisdiction and venue6 6 and may, in the case of personal jurisdic-

the statute [the notice] can not, therefore, supply constitutional validity to the statute or to
service under it." Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
Other commentators have been more skeptical of the reach of Wuchter, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 comment d (1980), and the Supreme Court's subsequent references to the case do not seem to attribute a sweeping scope to it, see, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315 (1964). However, Casad's view
derives at least implicit support from some recent Supreme Court cases. For example, in
Mennonite Bd. of Missions, discussed supra at note 61, the Court announced the following
sweeping principle: "Notice by mall or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty
or property interests of any party ... if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." Id. at 800 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 800-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Without knowing what state and individual interests will be at stake in future cases, the
Court espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever any legally protected
property interest may be adversely affected.") (emphasis in original).
" Title VII contains no provisions governing personal jurisdiction; thus, the reach of
courts' service of process in Title VII litigation is determined by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R Cxv. P. 1. Title VII does contain special venue provisions. See Title
VII § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). While situations in which majority employees will be outside the original court's jurisdiction or have valid venue objections are likely
to be infrequent, nevertheless they could arise in cases involving multi-state employers, see,
e.g., McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435, 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1976) (consent
decree entered in federal district court in Philadelphia covers AT&T employees nationwide;
court faced with subsequent suit observed that "to require AT&T employees from all over
the country to litigate [reverse discrimination] claims in Philadelphia would as a practical
matter nullify their Title VII rights"), or industry-wide consent decrees, compare United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 834 (5th Cir. 1975) (consent decree
entered in federal district court in Alabama covers more than 300,000 workers employed by
nine steel companies at 240-250 plants), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), with Goins v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of subsequent
suit filed in federal district court in Maryland challenging Allegheny-Ludlum decree; only
the federal district court in Alabama which entered the decree can exercise jurisdiction over
challenges to it), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
66 Cf. Consumers Union, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (mandatory intervention would force potential intervenors to "accept the
choice of a forum possibly sympathetic to the [original parties] and surely inconvenient or
impossible for [the intervenors]"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980). But cf. Note, supra note 49, at 1572-74 & n.130
(arguing that preclusion of nonintervenors to promote consolidation is acceptable "even if it
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tion, violate the due process clause. 67
It is easy to envision a mandatory intervention system that
would avoid the pitfalls of the Thaggard courts' approach: the
original parties could be required to give majority employees formal notice of the opportunity to intervene, and intervention could
be required only when consistent with limits on personal jurisdiction and venue. Yet there is strong reason to believe that federal
courts lack the power to develop such a system sua sponte. Rule 83
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts
to improvise procedures only when they are "not inconsistent with
these rules."68 But a mandatory intervention system seems inconsistent with the joinder provisions set out in rule 19, which states
that a nonparty having an interest relating to the subject of an
action shall be joined when "his absence may. . . leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.""9 Rule 19
makes it the parties' responsibility "to make certain that the court
has before it all those needed to enable it to serve the ends of justice. 1 0 In contrast, a mandatory intervention system would shift
that responsibility to nonparties and disallow them any further opportunity to be heard if they failed to intervene in the original action. The resulting conflict between a court's improvisation and
rule 19 would violate the limits that rule 83 sets on the discretionary power of the federal courts. 1

may sometimes achieve results inconsistent with rules of venue and service of process," except in cases where a special statutory provision for venue exists).
6 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 137
(1912), overruled on other grounds, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); McCoid, supra note 48, at 713, 720. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 41(2) & comment f (1980); Note, supra note 49, at 1574-75.
68 Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.
. . .In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice
in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
FED. R. CIv. P. 83; see also Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 165-66
(9th Cir. 1975).
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The authors of the rule made clear that its objectives are identical to those which would be served by a mandatory intervention system: avoiding duplicative litigation and the risk of inconsistent judgments. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 91 (1966). In addition, the rule directly addresses
some of the issues which would need to be considered in developing a mandatory intervention system: it provides that the nonparty will not be joined if joinder would violate principles of personal jurisdiction, venue, or subject-matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
70 Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1223.
71 Cf. id. (rule 19 "puts the burden on existing parties and the court to bring in those
whose presence is necessary or desirable [and a mandatory intervention principle] would
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In sum, principles of res judicata can preclude subsequent
suits only if majority employees are given notice of the original action in a manner consistent with the requirements of due process.
The Thaggard courts, however, dismiss subsequent suits in apparent reliance on a theory of mandatory intervention that fails to
satisfy those requirements. Moreover, because of the constraints of
rule 83, federal courts lack the power to adopt procedures which
could overcome that constitutional barrier.
B.

Comity

In addition to relying on res judicata, the Thaggard courts
base their decisions on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissing subsequent suits in deference to the original court's power
to control the operation of its consent decree. This approach suggests that the Thaggard courts are motivated by principles of comity. Those principles reflect the policy concerns that arise whenever two or more courts concurrently acquire jurisdiction7 2 over
closely related cases. 73 One concern is that the courts will unnecesabrogate the rule and its purpose completely"); McGhee v. United States, 437 F.2d 995, 9991000 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (court rejects mandatory intervention; rather, the defendant "should
have taken the initiative to consolidate" the original and subsequent suits).
71 In most cases that consider comity issues, none of the (multiple) actions has proceeded to judgment. See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
181-82 (1952); Mann Mfg., Inc. v. Hortex, Inc., 439 F.2d 403, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1971). In
contrast, in the cases considered in this comment, a judgment has been entered in the original action. Some courts have implied that once a judgment has been entered, principles of
comity become inapplicable and the issue should be decided under principles of res judicata.
See Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935); O'Hare Int'l Bank
v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972); Robertson v. Department of Defense, 402 F.
Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1975). However, special considerations exist when-as often occurs
in the employment discrimination context-the original court has issued an injunction
which remains in effect and which could be modified by that court. See supra note 32. In
such circumstances courts have concluded that principles of comity do continue to apply
and can justify deferring to the court that issued the injunction. See Gregory-Portland Indep. School Dist. v. Texas Educ. Agency, 576 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial court should
have dismissed or transferred the subsequent suit), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); Bergh
v. Washington, 535 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir.) (affirming dismissal of subsequent suit), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); Exxon Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 594 F. Supp. 84,
89-91 (D. Del. 1984) (transferring subsequent suit).
73 Some courts deem it appropriate to decline jurisdiction only when the two suits involve identical parties and issues. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd.,
422 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1970); North Carolina v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 480 F. Supp. 929, 932 (E.D.N.C. 1979); see also Consumers Union, Inc. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1219 & nn.46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court found it inappropriate to decline jurisdiction when-as is the case with subsequent suits by majority
employees-the plaintiff in the suit to be dismissed is not a party to the other action), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375
(1980).
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sarily duplicate effort; another is that they may issue inconsistent
judgments. 4 The latter concern is closely related to the notion that
75
courts should respect each other's authority and competence.
Comity principles allow a court to respond to these concerns
by exercising a discretionary authority to stay or dismiss a pending
action, thereby deferring to another court. 76 When all the courts
involved are federal district courts, "no precise rule has evolved"
to identify which court should proceed,7 7 although there is a presumption favoring the court that first acquired jurisdiction. 78 However, this presumption can be overcome by various "equitable"
79
considerations.
But the power of federal courts to dismiss suits based on comity concerns is limited. The overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue have held it inappropriate to defer to another
court when the plaintiff in the suit being dismissed cannot obtain a
hearing in that other court. s0 Further, there is reason to believe
Other courts are more flexible. See, e.g., Mann Mfg., 439 F.2d at 408 & n.6 ("substantial
overlap" is sufficient); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Weaver, 325 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dismissal affirmed even though defendants in the two cases were different), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 951 (1964); Exxon Corp., 594 F. Supp. at 90 (rejecting the approach taken in Consumers Union); see also Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (appropriate to
stay a suit pending resolution of a test case involving common issues but different parties).
The latter approach is clearly more responsive to policy concerns underlying the principles of comity, although it poses a greater risk of inequitable results. As long as this risk is
taken into account, it would seem appropriate to adopt the more flexible approach in the
employment discrimination context.
74 See, e.g., Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
75 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 242 (5th ed. 1979) ("[Clourts of one.
jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another ... jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect.").
76 See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1978); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967); see also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 31, § 1360,
at 637-41; supra note 72 (citing cases dismissing subsequent suits). Another alternative is
for one court to transfer the action before it to the district in which the other suit is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982); see, e.g., Exxon Corp., 594 F. Supp. at 91-92.
A court which believes that it is best suited to exercise jurisdiction can enjoin the parties from proceeding before other courts. See, e.g., Columbia Plaza Corp., 525 F.2d at 62729.
'. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
78 See, e.g., Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1218; O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459
F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972).
7 Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1952); see Columbia Plaza Corp., 525 F.2d at 627-29; cf. Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429
F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (2d Cir. 1970) (court considered equitable factors and concluded that
second suit should have been stayed).
80 See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738,
750 n.7 (9th Cir. 1979) (appropriate to decline jurisdiction "where the plaintiff is afforded a
full and fair opportunity to be heard in the other forum"); Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at
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that this limitation would be endorsed by the Supreme Court.
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,8 1 the Court considered the relationship between a statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction and the power of a federal court to
defer to state court proceedings. The cornerstone of the Court's
analysis was its recognition of the "virtually unflagging obligation
of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them. ' 82 The
Court noted that the broad leeway of lower federal courts to defer
to other federal courts accorded with that principle, but only because in such situations the case would be considered somewhere
in the federal system.83 As between federal and state courts, however, the "unflagging obligation" dictated a quite different approach to jurisdictional overlaps. The Court held that unless established abstention doctrines apply, federal courts should defer to
state courts only in "exceptional" circumstances in which the
"clearest of justifications" are present.8 4
Thus a strong presumption exists that federal courts should
exercise their jurisdiction, even when the only result of their failure to do so would be to consign the parties to state court. Given
that backdrop, it is difficult to justify dismissal when the outcome
is that plaintiffs will never receive a hearing on the merits of their
claims.8 5 While a court facing a subsequent suit in the employment
discrimination context might have power under comity principles
to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction until the majority employees
attempt to intervene in the other federal court action, the court
would exceed its power if it continued to demur after the majority
employees tried unsuccessfully to intervene in the other suit.
Finally, even if the discretionary dismissal power is as expansive as the Thaggard courts suggest, its reach will ultimately be
limited by the due process clause. Whether a subsequent court
1219 (power to decline jurisdiction "surely does not contemplate that fundamental rights of
citizens will be adjudicated in forums from which they are absent"); Mann Mfg., 439 F.2d at
408 (subsequent court should defer to original court "so long as it is apparent that a remedy
is available there"); see also Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 257 (1936) (a stay

pending resolution of test case "is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its
inception that its force will be spent within reasonable limits"). But cf. Special School Dist.
v. Mallory, 506 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (after noting that subsequent suit was
moot because plaintiff had been allowed to intervene in the original action, court added that
"this Court would abstain from exercising its jurisdiction even assuming, arguendo,that the
issues presented were not moot as a result of the plaintiff's joinder in the [original] action").
81424 U.S. 800 (1976).
82 Id. at 817.
83 Id.
84

Id. at 818-19.

85 See, e.g., Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1219 & n.49, 1221 & n.61.
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purports to defer to the original court on comity grounds or on the
basis of res judicata, the net result of the dismissal should be measured against the same due process standards. And when the net
result is that majority employees are left without a forum even
though they never received formal notice of an opportunity to assert their interests, the requirements of due process have not been
met.8 6
C.

Title VII's Policy of Encouraging Settlements

In addition to res judicata and principles of comity, the Thaggard courts have justified their dismissal of subsequent suits by
invoking a Title VII policy favoring the voluntary resolution of employment discrimination disputes. The Thaggardcourts argue that
this policy would be frustrated if majority employees are allowed
to bring subsequent suits which challenge consent decrees. While
those courts are curiously inarticulate about exactly why that
would be the case, the notion seems to be that potential exposure
to such suits might discourage employers from entering into con87
sent decrees.
This pro-settlement policy is reflected in Title VII's procedural requirements and in the role it establishes for the EEOC. 8
Before a would-be plaintiff may bring suit under Title VII, he
must file a timely "charge" with the EEOC briefly describing his
claim against his employer.8 9 After filing the charge, the plaintiff
88 See supra notes 37-64 and accompanying text.

See Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69; Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696; Prate, 430 F. Supp. at
1375. Of'these cases, only Dennison offers any explanation. See 658 F.2d at 696. One possible reasdn for the Thaggard courts' reticence is that the current incentives for settlement
may be excessively strong. An employer defending against a class action suit may have significant monetary exposure from the plaintiffs' claims for back pay. For such an employer, a
settlement which provides the plaintiffs with quotas but no back pay is quite attractive. It
could be attractive to the plaintiffs as well, when compared to the prospect of litigation
stretching out over several years and an uncertain chance of victory. However, the attractiveness of such a settlement from the employer's point of view is diminished significantly if
the employer can subsequently be subjected to monetary liability by majority employees.
8 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities. . . .Cooperation and
voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this
end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a
procedure whereby existing state and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well
as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit."); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1975); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398
F.2d 496, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1968).
89 Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982) ("A charge under this section shall
be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
87
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must wait 180 days while the EEOC investigates and, if it finds the
charge to be meritorious, attempts to resolve the dispute by "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 90 Only
after 180 days have expired may the plaintiff sue on his own behalf.9 1 While the legislative history of Title VII confirms that Congress intended these procedural requirements to foster settlement, 92 it is noteworthy that the requirements pertain only to the
period before a suit is filed.
Congress also enacted several special provisions governing the
conduct of Title VII suits once litigation is commenced. For instance, Congress provided for the expedited consideration of Title
VII suits, 93 the appointment of attorneys for private plaintiffs and
the waiver of fees, costs, and security, 9 awards of attorneys' fees,9
special venue rules, 98 and stays of Title VII suits for up to sixty
days pending resolution of state or local proceedings or of additional efforts to conciliate.9 7 However, of these provisions, only the
last is clearly aimed at promoting settlements. The others simply
make it easier for plaintiffs to bring employment discrimination
suits. 9s Moreover, aside from the specific provisions discussed here,
the legislative history suggests that Congress intended Title VII
suits to be governed by the same procedures as other types of
litigation. 99

Thus, in encouraging the voluntary resolution of employment
discrimination disputes, Congress focused primarily on the period

occurred."). The period is extended to up to 300 days if the charging party also institutes
proceedings at the state or local level. Id.
90 Id. § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
9" However, the plaintiff can act earlier if the EEOC dismisses the charge as meritless.
Id. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1) (1982); see Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,
411-12 (2d Cir. 1975).
,2See Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645, 651 & nn.12-15 (4th Cir.
1968) (discussing legislative history of Title VII), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); 405 F.2d
at 655 & nn.24-26 (Boreman, J., dissenting) (same).
93 Title VII § 706(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982).
I- Id. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1) (1982).
IsId. § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
Is Id. § 706()(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(3) (1982).
,7Id. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
IsThat goal was discussed by Senator Humphrey in his detailed explanation of the
"Dirksen-Mansfield" substitute amendment. See 110 CONG. REc. 12,721-25 (1964), reprinted
in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMIsSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII ND
IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3003-08 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Is See 111 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memorandum introduced by Sens.
Clark and Case) (once suit is brought, it "would proceed in the usual manner for litigation
in the Federal courts"), reprinted in 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 3044.
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leading up to the filing of suit. To the extent that Congress considered the pro-settlement policy to be relevant thereafter, it implemented the policy by providing for brief stays pending conciliation.
While it is easy to imagine additional post-filing measures that
Congress might have adopted to further this policy, courts should
hesitate to take steps which Congress itself failed to take.10 0 In
short, since Congress has not explicitly authorized the courts to
dismiss subsequent suits in order to promote settlements, the
courts should be reluctant to imply such a power.
Even assuming that the pro-settlement policy has some relevance in determining whether subsequent suits by majority employees should be allowed, it is not the only relevant policy. By
permitting majority as well as minority employees to bring suits
under Title VII, 101 Congress has expressed a competing policy-the
desire to protect the interests of majority employees. While the
scope of this protection is still unclear, courts have acknowledged
that the use of quotas is limited by the substantive rights of majority employees.'° /These rights are meaningless, however, if majority
employees lack' an opportunity to assert them/ Courts should
therefore be wary of procedural shortcuts, like 'the dismissal of
subsequent suits, that encourage settlement of original actions but
simultaneously restrict majority employees' ability to protect their
interests.
-*This view of Title VII's pro-settlement policy is supported by
the Supreme Court's decision in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759.103 There the employer had entered into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC that required the employer to maintain the
existing percentage of female employees in its workforce in the
event of layoffs. However, a collective bargaining agreement called
for layoffs to be made on the basis of seniority. When the employer
chose to follow the conciliation agreement and laid off male em100See, e.g., Mercado v. Calumet Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir.
1985) ("Congress always has some objective in view when it legislates, and it is always possible to move a little farther in the direction of that objective. The fact that Congress has
pointed in a particular direction does not authorize a court to march in that direction without limit.").
101 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). In McDonald, the Court also held that white employees could bring employment discrimination claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). 427 U.S. at 286-87.
102 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (implicitly
identifying limits on an employer's ability to adopt quotas without any action by a court).
Majority employees may have even broader rights with respect to quotas established by a
consent decree, or imposed by a court after a trial. See infra note 133.
10M 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
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ployees in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
union submitted the dispute to arbitration. On appeal, the Court
104
upheld arbitration awards in favor of laid-off male employees.
In the course of its decision, the Court made clear that Title
VII's pro-settlement policy was not without limits: the Court refused to permit "the employer's added incentive to conciliate [to]
be paid for with the union's contractual rights. '105 Also, the Court
recognized that the pro-settlement policy had to be balanced with
competing federal interests, here the federal labor policy of promoting certainty in collective bargaining relationships. It concluded that "[a]bsent a judicial determination," neither the EEOC
nor the employer could abrogate the collective bargaining agreement without the union's consent.1 06
W.R. Grace thus confirms that there are substantial limits on
the extent to which Title VII's pro-settlement policy insulates voluntary arrangements such as conciliation agreements from later
challenges by nonparty majority employees. One might argue, however, that these limits do not apply to the Thaggard cases because
they differ from W.R. Grace in two significant respects: (1) the
male employees' claims in W.R. Grace were contract-based, while
the claims of applicants or nonunion majority employees who bring
subsequent suits are typically statute-based; and (2) the dispute in
W.R. Grace involved an out-of-court agreement between the EEOC
and the employer, while the subsequent suits in the Thaggard
cases involve court-approved consent decrees.
Nevertheless, these differences are insufficient to distinguish
the two situations. First, it is not clear why applicants or nonunion
employees in subsequent suits should have less opportunity to assert their Title VII claims than unionized employees have to raise
104 Id. at 763-64, 772.
105

Id. at 771.

I" Id. at 771-72. The Court did not define what it meant by suggesting that a collective
bargaining agreement could be abrogated after "a judicial determination." When a court
enters a consent decree it does not resolve the underlying issue of whether the employer
actually discriminated against minority employees in violation of Title VII or other law. See
supra notes 1, 25 and accompanying text. Thus if a "judicial determination" means a trial
on the merits of that issue, then the level of review undertaken by a court which enters a
consent decree would appear to be insufficient to justify abrogating a collective bargaining
agreement absent the union's consent.
However, elsewhere in its opinion the Court appeared to reserve that question. See 461
U.S. at 767 n.9 (citing Dennison,see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text, Court noted
that it was not deciding whether an arbitral award "could be enforced in the face of a valid
judicial alteration of seniority provisions"); Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786, 795 n.6
(7th Cir.) (interpreting footnote 9 of W.R. Grace), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 296 (1984).
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their contractual claims. 10 7 Second, although judicial oversight of
consent decrees provides a potential check against abuse that does
not exist for out-of-court agreements, the effectiveness of that
check is ultimately limited. Courts do not resolve the merits of the
underlying dispute when they review consent decrees, 10 8 and the
original parties are unlikely to assert the majority employees' arguments very vigorously when those arguments could cause the court
to withhold approval of the consent decree.
In sum, Title VII's pro-settlement policy seems far less expansive and free-floating than the Thaggard courts suggest. And even
if the Thaggard courts are correct in that respect, the policy must
nevertheless be balanced against the competing federal interest in
the adequate protection of the rights of majority employees. Thus,
it seems doubtful that the pro-settlement policy provides any real
support for the Thaggard courts' adoption of a mandatory intervention system.
In addition, even if there was no doubt that Congress approved of the Thaggardcourts' system, the inquiry would not be at
an end. The right to bring a cause of action under Title VII is a
form of property that is protected by the due process clause, and
that therefore cannot be extinguished in a way that violates the
clause.10 9 The Thaggard courts' mandatory intervention system-under which this property interest can be extinguished without any notice to majority employees-violates established principles of due process. 11 0 The due process objection would exist even
if Congress had explicitly incorporated the Thaggard system into
Title VII: the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that because the legislature is not obligated to grant a property interest to someone, it can choose to grant the interest on the
condition that it can be withdrawn without regard to due process." 1 Thus, even if Title VII's pro-settlement policy is as expansive as the Thaggard courts suggest and even if it outweighs the
competing interest in protecting majority employees' rights, the
mandatory intervention system adopted by those courts is invalid
under the due process clause.

107 But see infra note 137.

o See supra notes 1, 25.
109 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-31 (1982) ("Mullane ...

held that a
ment's Due
11 See
1" See

cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth AmendProcess Clause.").
supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
Logan, 455 U.S. at 431-33; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 & n.6 (1980).
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REDUCING THE COSTS IMPOSED BY COLLATERAL ATTACKS

The preceding section demonstrated that requiring intervention without providing adequate notice to potential intervenors violates the due process clause, and that courts lack the power to
cure that constitutional defect. It also showed that principles of
comity offer no support for courts to decline jurisdiction in favor of
unavailable forums. Finally, it established that the pro-settlement
policy of Title VII does not justify dismissal of subsequent suits by
majority employees.
What this means is that both existing and future consent decrees that establish quotas are open to collateral attack by nonparty majority employees. As the Thaggard courts noted, such
subsequent suits pose several dangers: unfairness to the original
parties, the risk of inconsistent judgments, and duplication of effort.11 2 However, there are several means of reducing or eliminating
these problems which should be explored by the courts.
Intervention. Courts should relax the timeliness requirement
of rule 24 and allow nonparty majority employees or their union to
intervene in the original action at any stage, rather than force untimely intervenors to bring their claims in a separate suit.113 This
approach would eliminate the possibility of inconsistent judgments, since a court could modify its judgment in the original ac4
tion to accord with any relief granted to majority employees.,
Whenever possible, the intervenors should be designated as representatives of a class of majority employees, so that later efforts to
intervene or to bring subsequent suits can be barred under traditional principles of res judicata." 5
See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
'3 Such a liberalization should be within the substantial discretion which courts enjoy
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in making timeliness determinations. Certainly the need to avoid violating majority employees' due process rights on the one hand, and the risk of inconsistent judgments on the other,
would appear to be an "unusual circumstance" capable of justifying late intervention. See
supra note 53.
A liberal approach to intervention was taken in EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 506
F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). There the trial court entered a consent decree on January 18, 1973.
A union representing majority employees had been "repeatedly invited to join in the negotiations" leading to the decree, but had remained aloof. Id. at 741. The union finally sought

intervention on February 9, 1973, and the Third Circuit allowed it "to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2) as a party defendant." Id.
"' See supra note 32 (discussing the original court's power to modify the decree).
1'5 See supra note 43 (discussing res judicata in class action context); Miller v. Staats,
706 F.2d 336, 339 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (allowing a class of majority employees to intervene in original suit); see also Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941, 945
n.7 (S.D.N.Y.) (allowing a group of potential residents to intervene and be certified as a
defendant class under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)(B) in a lawsuit over the allocation of units in
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Joinder. Another way in which courts and the original parties
can reduce or eliminate the threat of subsequent suits is by joining
the majority employees or their union as parties to the original action. Several provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
relevant to joinder. Rule 20(a) provides that
[a]ll persons. . . may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
116
defendants will arise in the action.
While the joinder of majority employees or their union seems to
meet the "common question of law or fact" requirement, the "right
to relief" requirement would not appear to be satisfied since the
minority plaintiffs seek no relief from them. However, some courts
have interpreted the latter requirement as permitting joinder when
the nonparty has interests which would be affected by the lawsuit.117 This seems to be the better view, and joinder of majority
employees or their union should be allowed under rule 20(a).
The second provision is rule 19(a)(2), which provides that a
person shall be joined when
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may. . . leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.1 8
Majority employees or their union would seem to meet both requirements of this test. Indeed, a number of courts have ordered
the joinder of unions under rule 19(a) when the relief sought in the
original action would conflict with their collective bargaining
a public housing project), rev'd on other grounds, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. -1973).
116

FED.

R. Civ. P. 20(a). In addition, the nonparty can be joined only if he is subject to

the process of the court and cannot raise valid objections to venue. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20
advisory committee note ("The provisions of this rule for the joinder of parties are subject
to rule 82 (Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected).").
'" See, e.g., Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 373 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (joinder of union under rule 20(a) is appropriate "[i]n light of the critical involvement of the
collective bargaining agreement and its interpretation and application to plaintiff's
allegations").
11e FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Rule 19(a) further provides that a person shall not be joined if
doing so would violate principles of personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, or
venue. Rule 19(b) identifies several factors which courts should consider in determining
whether to allow the action to proceed if the person cannot be joined.
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agreement.119 Courts have been more reluctant to order the joinder
of individual majority 120employees, although joinder has been ordered in several cases.

Yet there are some practical problems with joinder in this context. First, it is unclear whether a union can or should represent
the interests of majority employees or applicants in a contest
against minority employees or applicants: not only is the union
likely to have members on both sides of the dispute,' 2 ' but it also
"" See EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1095-96 (6th Cir.
1974); McDowell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1734, 1735 (E.D.
Ark. 1981); Coker v. Marmon Group, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D.S.C. 1978); see also
Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 765, 823-28 (1975); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1620 (1972 & Supp. 1985); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 & n.43 (1977) (even though union found not to have violated Title
VII, it "will properly remain in this litigation as a defendant so that full relief may be
awarded the victims of the employer's post-Act discrimination"). But see Potter v. Continental Trailways, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 207, 212-13 (D. Colo. 1979) ("Since union members have
no vested rights in seniority positions based on illegal exclusions, the unions simply cannot
claim an interest in protecting so-called seniority rights of its members.").

However, there is considerable resistance to finding that the union is an indispensable
party whose absence requires dismissal under rule 19(b). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1107 & n.74, 1108-09 & n.87 (1983); see also Hibbler v.
Miller's of Birmingham Bankhead Highway, Inc., 496 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam). But see McDowell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1735 (union held to be an
indispensable party; joinder impossible because union not named in EEOC charge).
Among courts ordering the joinder of unions, some expressly limit the union's participation to the remedy stage, see, e.g., Coker, 455 F. Supp. at 402, while others appear to give
the union the option of also participating in the determination of liability, see, e.g., MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d at 1095.
120 Those approving joinder include English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43,
46-48 (5th Cir. 1972), and Bremer v. St. Louis S.R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-40 (E.D. Mo.
1969) (individual majority employee who holds position allegedly denied to minority plaintiff in violation of Title VII held to be a necessary party). Those rejecting it include Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (since majority
employees "cannot legitimately assert a protectable interest, they need not be joined"), and
Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. 162, 173 (D. Mass.) (motion to dismiss for failure to join a
necessary party denied), aff'd sub nom. Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1975).
Courts are very unwilling to find majority employees to be indispensable parties in whose
absence the action must be dismissed under rule 19(b). See, e.g., English, 465 F.2d at 48 &
n.13.
M1See Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 100 F.R.D. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (describing
union's ambiguous role in a Title VII suit), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 1465 (3d Cir. 1984); Banks
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 51 F.R.D. 304, 305 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (union has "equal duty" to
represent interests of majority and minority members; hence, it "cannot fairly and adequately" represent the former in the lawsuit brought by the latter); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 31, § 4456, at 492-93; see also English, 465 F.2d at 46-47 (although a
union can adequately represent the interests of its majority members in some cases, in other
cases individual majority members should be joined). But see EEOC v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1977) (union representatives challenging a consent decree "recognize that in making their broad-gauged challenge they may be acting inconsistently with the best interests of some of the persons whom they represent in the collective
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may be difficult for the union to represent the interests of majority
applicants who are not yet union members. 2 2 Second, if no union
exists or if the union is not an adequate representative, then individual majority employees or applicants will have to be joined.
With all but the smallest employers, it would probably be necessary to certify a defendant class of applicants or employees, 2 3 and
it would be up to the plaintiff to designate the class representative.12 4 But it may be difficult to identify a willing class representative, 2 5 especially given the uncertainty about whether
that repre26
fees.
attorneys'
for
reimbursed
be
sentative would
bargaining process, but point out that this potential conflict is inherent in the collective
bargaining relationship"), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 119, at 1108 n.83;
see also Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 54, 61-62 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (individual
majority employees are not indispensable parties because the union will adequately represent their interests; however, they should be notified of the pendency of the action),
vacated on other grounds, 68 F.R.D. 686, 690 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
122 But see Schwarzschild, supra note 25, at 925-26 (although applicants were neither
members of the majority employees' union nor represented by it in collective bargaining, the
union might be able to represent their interests in litigation).
123 No cases have been found in which majority employees or applicants were joined as
a defendant class. This may be due to the availability of the seemingly less cumbersome
option of having unions represent the interests of majority employees and applicants. Nevertheless, it appears that majority employees or applicants could qualify as a defendant
class under rules 23(b)(1)(B) or 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Note,
Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV.630, 633-34 (1978); 1 HERBERT NEWBERG, NEwBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4.45, 4.54-.57, 4.63-.64 (1985); see also supra note 115 (defendant
class of intervenors certified in Otero).
124 See Note, supra note 123, at 639-40.
125 However, it should be noted that a court may decline to certify a defendant class if
it is not satisfied that the designated class representative will adequately represent the class.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also Note, supra note 123, at 641. See generally id. at 64147 (discussing methods of ensuring that representation is adequate); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra
note 123, § 4.58 (same).
126 Section 706(k) of Title VII provides: "In any action or proceeding under this title
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ...a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). Similarly, section 1988 of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides: "Inany action or proceeding to enforce
a provision of [42 U.S.C.] sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title .... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
Courts and commentators have interpreted these statutes as being intended to favor
plaintiffs. For example, prevailing plaintiffs are denied fees only in rare instances. See, e.g.,
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Tamanaha, The Cost of
Preserving Rights: Attorneys' Fee Awards and Intervenors in Civil Rights Litigation, 19
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 125 & nn.68, 69 (1984). In contrast, prevailing defendants are
awarded fees only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or

without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Gar-

ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
This structure evolved in the two-party context of minority employees suing their employer, and it is difficult to determine how majority employees should fit into it. The issue
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Even if these potential problems can be resolved and joinder
proves workable in this context, the original parties may prefer to
risk subsequent suits rather than stir up opposition which otherwise might remain dormant. In that event, a court should acquiesce in the parties' decision and not compel the joinder of other
parties.
Prospective Remedies Only. If a consent decree has been entered and quotas have begun to operate before majority employees
enter the dispute-whether by intervention, by joinder, or by
bringing a subsequent suit-the employer should not be penalized
for having complied with the decree. Courts should not award
damages to majority employees, and should refuse to rescind hirings and promotions already made under the decree: in the event
that majority employees triumph, contested quotas would be modi-

has been considered to some extent in cases where minority plaintiffs have asked courts to
award attorneys' fees against unions or majority employees who intervened as defendants.
Most courts have considered the intervenors to be "defendants" for the purposes of attorneys' fee statutes, and have required them to pay a portion of the prevailing plaintiffs' fees.
See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1061-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Tamanaha, supra, at 149 n.143. Others have considered them to be "functionally plaintiffs"
and have refused to require them to pay the plaintiffs' fees. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York
State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 524 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The latter view seems more in keeping with the legislative history of the attorneys' fees
statutes, which suggests that a party's formal designation as defendant or plaintiff should
not be determinative. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.4 (1976); Kirkland, 524
F. Supp. at 1218. Furthermore, the legislative history does not suggest that courts should
draw distinctions based on whether the person seeking fees belongs to a minority group or a
majority group. S. REP. No. 1011, supra, at 2-5. But see Tamanaha, supra, at 148-52
("Courts must strongly favor a party found to be in a minority group [in part because] civil
rights statutes themselves were written mainly for minority groups, and for many years have
been used exclusively by them.
...). Under this view, majority employees would not be
required to pay minority employees' attorneys' fees unless the majority employees' claims
satisfied the ChristiansburgGarment standard of "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Furthermore, majority employees should be able to recover their own attorneys'
fees from their employer if they can satisfy the more lenient standards for prevailing plaintiffs. See, e.g., Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
An alternate, non-statutory ground exists under which a majority employee who either
serves as a class representative, or litigates on his own behalf and thereby confers benefits
on other majority employees, might be able to recover attorneys' fees from the employer or
the other employees. It is the so-called "common benefit" or "common fund" theory,
whereby a litigant conferring a benefit on a group of people can recover attorneys' fees from
that group or from the opposing party. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1973); 6 J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77[2] (2d ed. 1981 &
Supp. 1985). One court has applied this theory in the employment discrimination context to
grant attorneys' fees to members of a plaintiff class whose motion to intervene to challenge
a proposed settlement was denied, but whose participation in modifying the settlement
agreement was nevertheless deemed beneficial to the class as a whole. See Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 738, 740-42 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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fled or eliminated prospectively. 2 ' In addition, courts could decline to interfere with the operation of quotas pending the resolution of the majority employees' claims, except in extreme
situations. 128
Limiting the Issues. Finally, whether majority employees
enter the dispute by way of intervention, or joinder, or by bringing
a subsequent suit, the role which they play can be strictly tailored
to reflect the nature of their substantive interests. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet determined the extent of those interests in a case involving a consent decree, 12 9 the best guidance to
that question can be found in United Steelworkers of America v.
I
Weber.30
In Weber, the, Supreme Court considered a majority employee's Title VII challenge to an affirmative-action plan that had
been adopted by the employer without any involvement by a court,
rather than established by a consent decree. The Court observed
with approval that the plan was "designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" manifested in a sharp
difference between the percentages of blacks in'the training program at issue and in the local workforce.' 3' The Court also noted
that the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel" white employees'
interests since "[it] does not require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees [nor]-does the plan
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees
the program will be white. [Finally,
[since] half of those trained 1in
32
1
measure.'
temporary
a
it] is
27 Courts could reach this result by holding that good faith compliance with the terms
of a consent decree does not violate Title VH or other law. See Ashley v. City of Jackson,
464 U.S. 900, 903 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); cf. Title VII
§ 713(b), 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-12(b)(1) (1982) (establishing a defense for employers who take
actions "in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or
opinion of the [EEOC]"). Alternatively, courts could use their discretionary remedial authority under Title VH to deny majority employees relief for the period prior to adjudication of their claims. See id. § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-80 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 41325 (1975).
128 In considering requests for interim modifications of quotas, courts would presumably look to the relatively open-ended factors which they consider when minority employees
seek interim relief in original actions: "the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the existence of irreparable injury, the degree of harm to the defendant from the issuance and to
the plaintiff from the denial of such injunctive relief, and the public interest." B. ScHLFm &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 119, at 1412-13.

12'

But see infra note 133.

...443 U.S. 193 (1979).
131Id. at 208, 198-99.
132

Id. at 208.
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Although Weber involved a challenge to a quota adopted by
an employer without any judicial involvement, its analysis also
seems applicable to consent decrees, since in both situations the
employer voluntarily agrees to establish quotas. 133 Thus some
lower courts which have been presented with proposed consent decrees that would establish quotas have relied on the Weber analysis in deciding whether to approve the decrees. For example, they
have concluded that the quotas cannot "unnecessarily trammel"
majority employees' interests in the ways suggested by the Weber
opinion.13 4 They also have sought evidence that minority employees have suffered some discrimination or disadvantage, a requirement which is designed "'to ensure that new forms of invidious
discrimination are not approved in the guise of [race-conscious
remedies].' ,135 The amount of discrimination or disadvantage that
must be shown is not entirely clear. It appears, however, that an
"identifiable statistical disparity" between the actual composition
of the employer's work force and the expected composition absent
discrimination is a sufficient showing, even if it falls short of violating Title VII or some other law. 3 6
"I3In

Weber, the fact that the quota was voluntarily adopted by the employer played a

prominent role in the Court's analysis. See id. at 200, 205-08. Thus there would seem to be a
sound basis for distinguishing voluntarily adopted quotas-whether adopted by the employer without action by a court, or established by a consent decree-from quotas that are
imposed by a court after a trial on the merits of the minority employees' claims. See
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2605 n.9 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, Stotts can be read both as casting doubt on the validity of court-imposed quotas, and as implying that this doubt extends to quotas established
by consent decrees. See id. at 2588-90; cf. id. at 2605 & n.9, 2608-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If that turns out to be correct, then the scope of majority employees' interests would be
far broader than this comment suggests. That question may be answered by the Supreme
Court when it reviews Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.
1985) (applying Weber standards to determine whether a consent decree impermissibly infringes on majority employees' interests), cert. granted sub nom. Local Number 93, Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985) (No. 84-1999).
M See, e.g., City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 484-85, 489 n.10; Kirkland v. New York
State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1132, 1135 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 553 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.
Ct. 2576 (1984).
"' Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1130 (quoting Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968
(8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
13 While some courts have approved quotas where the minority employees made out a
prima facie case of discrimination, see, e.g., Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1130 ("[A] showing of a
prima facie case of employment discrimination through a statistical demonstration of disproportionate racial impact [is sufficient] to serve as a predicate for a voluntary compromise
containing race conscious remedies."), others have held that an "identifiable statistical disparity" short of a prima facie case is sufficient, see, e.g., Stotts, 679 F.2d at 552-53 & n.10;
see also City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 484 ("A consent decree may not embody an affirma-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:147

This understanding of the substantive interests of majority
employees provides a basis for limiting the role that majority employees can play in challenging quotas established by consent decrees. Majority employees should not be permitted to force a trial
on the issue of whether their employer had in fact discriminated
137
against minority employees in violation of Title VII or other law,
since under Weber an employer need not have violated the law as a
precondition for voluntarily adopting a quota. Rather, adversarial
factfinding should be limited to the narrow question of whether
there is an "identifiable statistical disparity" that is sufficient to
support quotas. In addition to that factual challenge, majority employees should also be allowed to make legal arguments, such as
that the quotas "unnecessarily trammel" their interests in the
ways suggested by Weber.
Finally, the substantive interests that majority employees can
assert, and the procedural opportunities which they are afforded to
assert those interests, should not vary depending on whether the
majority employees enter the dispute by intervention, by joinder,
or by bringing a subsequent suit. Presently, there is potentially
wide variation: there is some authority that implies that majority
employees who are joined as parties to the original suit or who intervene in it can force a trial on the merits of the minority plaintiffs' claims; 38 other cases suggest that majority employees' claims

tive action plan unless the employer has utilized minorities at a rate less than their proportion in the relevant labor market.").
137 See, e.g., Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1126-30 (where minority plaintiffs have made a
showing of a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination, intervening majority employees cannot force a trial at which they would defend the "job-relatedness" of the discriminatory employment practice). One court has permitted a union, once joined, to force minority employees to prove their claims at trial. See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d
435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980)
(in denying unions' motions to intervene in the original suit, court observed that "there is a
distinct probability that the intervention of the unions will destroy the consent decree and
force a trial on the merits"). While the court in City of Miami emphasized that the proposed quotas would violate the majority employees' collective bargaining agreement, the
logic of the court's opinion could be extended to cover situations where no collective bargaining agreement was involved and the majority employees were raising only Title VII or
other discrimination claims. See 664 F.2d at 447 (Rubin, J., concurring) ("A party potentially prejudiced by a decree has a right to a judicial determination of the merits of its
objection. . . .Those who seek affirmative remedial goals that would adversely affect other
parties must demonstrate the propriety of such relief."). But see Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1127
(City of Miami's analysis is limited to situations where majority employees' contractual
rights are implicated). The holding of City of Miami has been sharply criticized. See 2 A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 56.32 (1985).
138 See supra note 137 (discussing City of Miami and Culbreath).
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can be considered under ad hoc procedures;"3 9 and still other
courts suggest that if majority employees are allowed to bring subsequent suits, then the range of substantive issues which could be
140
raised in such suits is even narrower than Weber would allow.
These differing approaches misconstrue the nature of majority employees' interests, and provide the original parties with powerful
incentives to keep majority employees out of the original suit. The
better approach is to recognize that majority employees can make
the limited claims suggested by the Weber opinion, and to consider
those claims in the same manner as any other claims brought in
14
federal court. 1
3, The most extreme view, that it is sufficient for nonparty majority employees to be
offered an opportunity to participate in a "fairness hearing" where they are allowed to voice
objections to a proposed decree, was apparently taken by the Ninth Circuit in Dennison.
See supra notes 50, 51. Under that approach, majority employees remain nonparties and
apparently would be unable to appeal the trial court's entry of the decree. One commentator
has advocated a more formal approach under which majority employees would be "granted
limited intervention" in the original suit; the trial court, before entering the decree, would
hold a fairness hearing and thereby develop a "record . . . articulat[ing] the statistical evidence of discrimination"; the trial court would be required to "explain whatever action it
takes"; majority employees could appeal that action; and, appellate review would be somewhat less deferential than it is now. Schwarzschild, supra note 25, at 929-34. Some courts
appear to utilize something like the Schwarzschild approach. See, e.g., City of Cleveland,
753 F.2d at 482 (district court entered consent decree after it "held an evidentiary hearing
to consider the [intervening union's] objections"); Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1124 (court held
hearings to consider intervening majority employees' objections). However, it is difficult to
tell exactly what procedures were followed in those cases, and there is reason to think that
the majority employees may not have been afforded the full range of procedural protections
which usually apply to a party bringing a claim in federal court. For example, in City of
Cleveland the district court "issued no findings of fact or conclusions of law. None of the
procedures generally required by due process was followed." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985) (No. 84-1999).
110 In EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1980), black employees
challenged a consent decree granting retroactive seniority to female employees. The court
held that "conciliation agreements resulting in consent decrees may not be considered independent acts of discrimination, as a matter of law, [absent] allegations of bad faith [which
suggest that] the agreement was not a bona fide attempt to conciliate a claim but rather an
attempt to bestow unequal employment benefits under the guise of remedying discrimination." Id. at 1238. The McCall court did not explain what would constitute a "bona fide
attempt," though the implication would seem to be that a decree which establishes quotas
and fails to meet the requirements of Weber could nonetheless be a "bona fide attempt." If
so, then this comment rejects the McCall standard. Rather, majority employees who are
forced to bring a subsequent suit should be entitled to claim that the Weber requirements
have not been met; if those claims are substantiated, the quotas should be modified or eliminated prospectively. See supra notes 127-28 (discussing remedies).
141 If district courts adhere to established procedural rules when considering majority
employees' claims, it does not necessarily follow that majority employees will be able to
force a trial in every case. As with any claimant in the federal courts, majority employees
will be vulnerable to motions for summary judgment under rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules
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CONCLUSION

Courts have struggled to find the proper role for majority employees in employment discrimination lawsuits brought by their
minority colleagues. The courts' instinct is that employment discrimination suits should be resolved in a single proceeding. While
that instinct is probably correct, many courts have chosen an improper means to implement it: they have dismissed subsequent
suits whether or not any basis exists for doing so under principles
of res judicata or comity.
While such disputes strain the limits of established principles
of civil procedure and due process, they need not break those limits. A partial solution is for courts to be more liberal in allowing
majority employees to intervene in the original action, as well as
permitting the joinder of majority employees when one of the original parties requests it. Beyond that, courts must develop a more
precise understanding of majority employees' substantive interests
in order to tailor the procedural role which majority employees can
play. Finally, that role should be the same whether majority employees intervene in the original suit, are joined as parties to that
suit, or are forced to bring a subsequent suit.
Mark E. Recktenwald

of Civil Procedure. Given the narrowness of the factual issues that could be raised by majority employees, see supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text, it seems doubtful that many
cases would proceed beyond summary judgment. Cf. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 482
(percentage of minority residents in Cleveland was 46.9%; percentage of minority firefighters occupying the rank of lieutenant or above was only 4.5%).

